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1 Introduction
At least since the work of Knight (1921), economists have understood that economic agents
may behave di¤erently in risky circumstances, where outcomes are random but governed
by known probabilities, as opposed to uncertain circumstances, where risks are unknown.
Ellsberg (1961) provides examples that highlight the tendency for some decision makers to
be averse to the presence of Knightian uncertainty or, ambiguity.
In recent years, there has been an explosion of theoretical work developing models
that incorporate ambiguity aversion, building o¤ of the seminal contribution of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). In the literature to date, Knightian uncertainty has been a factor
inserted in a model that could possibly explain puzzling observations. It has served a
role analogous to that of dark matter in cosmological models, lurking behind the scenes
to explain observed phenomena, never being directly observed. At the same time, a rich
literature has evolved exploring the e¢ ciency of betting and prediction markets that price
specic events. Following on the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Asch,
Malkiel and Quandt (1982), the ability of these markets to predict future events has been
studied extensively, and a number of empirical anomalies have been identied.
In this paper, we extend the theoretical literature and connect it to the prediction-
market application. In so doing, we develop more direct observable implications of the
presence of Knightian uncertainty than has been achieved previously in the literature, and
a method to test for its presence.
While we below will formally derive a model that suggests our test, the intuition of our
approach is quite straightforward and can be illustrated using an example from Ellsberg
(1961). Suppose that we have two urns. In one urn, we have 50 black balls and 50 red balls.
In another urn the Knightian urn we have 100 balls, but we have no information
regarding the proportions. A subject is o¤ered a game. If she pulls a black ball out of the
urn, she wins $1. If she pulls a red ball out she wins nothing. The literature has documented
a tendency for individuals to prefer the urn with the known probabilities, suggesting that
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they exhibit the aversion to ambiguity discussed above.
Suppose that an econometrician could observe games played with both of the urns in
Ellsbergs game. With a number of repeated trials, the sample proportions from the rst
urn would fairly rapidly indicate an estimate that the binomial probability of victory is 50
percent. With enough data, one would say that with great condence. On the other hand,
if one observed repeated play with the second, Knightian urn which, after all, has some
number of black balls in it, then the sample proportion would also converge to an estimated
binomial probability, but that probability would not necessarily be 50 percent.
The observation that motivates this paper stems from this thought experiment. Given a
market derived ex ante probability of a binary event, as one frequently observes in betting
markets, there will naturally be circumstances where information is extremely solid, and
odds are quite far from 50 percent. There will also be situations where information suggests
there is an even match (as with a coin ip), and the contract suggests there is close to a 50
percent chance of either outcome. This often happens, for example, in presidential futures
markets in the U.S. after the conventions are over. But it is also possible that there are
contracts that suggest that the odds of either outcome are 50 percent because the event
is shrouded in ambiguity. If we were to estimate the ex post sample proportions from just
these contracts with ex ante 50 percent probabilities, then they could, as in the Ellsberg
example above, be anything. If we were to estimate the ex post sample proportions of the
high information contracts with probabilities far from 50 percent, the proportions and ex
ante probabilities should, if markets are e¢ cient, align. But close to 50 percent, they might
not, and if they do not, it is an indication of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Thus,
the pattern by which the relationship between ex post proportions and ex ante probabilities
deviates from the 45 degree line becomes informative regarding the presence of Knightian
uncertainty. We also discuss the extent to which learning can occur in markets over time.
If Knightian uncertainty induces knowledge acquisition, then the relationship between pro-
portions and probabilities will evolve as a market matures, a possibility we explore in the
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paper.
The next subsection briey reviews the literature. In Sections 2 and 3, we draw on
the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Dow and Werlang (1992) and develop a
model that suggests that the pattern described by our intuitive example would emerge in
a market inuenced by the present of signicant Knightian uncertainty. In Section 4, we
provide some high-level evidence that the relationship between ex post proportions and ex
ante probabilities is consistent with the predictions of our model. Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper draws from two di¤erent strands in the literature. First, theorists have made
remarkable strides in recent years incorporating Knightian uncertainty and ambiguity aver-
sion into models of nancial markets.
These models have, according to an exhaustive recent review, implications for portfolio
choice and asset pricing that are very di¤erent from those of SEU (subjective expected
utility theory) and that help to explain otherwise puzzling features of the data.1 Ambiguity
aversion could help explain the tendency of markets to stop operating during nancial crises,
for prices to not be completely informative, and even for there to be bank runs.2
This branch of the literature has focused on nancial markets in general. At the same
time, an equally impressive literature has emerged exploring the functioning of prediction
markets, which, for the most part, price in the probability of specic binary events. As
Thaler and Ziemba (1988) rst noted, these prediction markets may be a better laboratory
to test cutting edge theories, as they contain contracts with known durations, and observable
discrete events that stop the trading. While an equity might live on virtually forever, a
presidential election future has a specic end date, and its ability to forecast the outcome
can be precisely evaluated.
1See Epstein and Schneider (2010), p. 315.
2See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Caballero and Simsek (2013), Guidolin and Rinaldi (2010),
Routledge and Zin (2009), and Uhlig (2013).
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This second literature has advanced both empirically and theoretically. On the the-
oretical side, Ali (1977) and Manski (2004) illustrate that the beliefs of bettors may not
necessarily yield a market-based probability. More recently, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006)
identify the conditions under which prediction-market prices coincide with bettorsmean
beliefs about probabilities. On the empirical side, prediction markets have been found to
be informative regarding the odds of events occurring. Berg et al. (2008), for example, nd
that the Iowa Electronic Markets outperformed polls in predicting election outcomes. At
the same time, markets have been found to exhibit a favorite-longshot bias, with favorites
outperforming their odds, and longshots underperforming (see, e.g., Cain, Law and Peel,
2000). A number of possible explanations for this pattern include insider trading (Shin,
1992), risk-loving behavior (Weitzman, 1965; Quandt, 1986), belief dispersion (Gandhi and
Serrano-Padia, 2015), and imperfect ability to process information (Snowberg and Wolfers,
2010).
The connection of these two literatures seems quite promising, as betting markets often
exist for events, such as Brexit or elections, for which Knightian uncertainty may well
be present. Since they also have nite and determinate life spans, they also allow the
econometrician the ability to evaluate their performance ex post. We now turn to illustrating
the utility of this approach.
2 A Model of Prediction Market with Ambiguity
2.1 Setup
Events and Contracts. Consider a prediction market for the occurrence of a binary
event. There are two all-or-nothing contracts corresponding to the two possible realizations.
One contract pays $1 if event A occurs and $0 otherwise, while the other contract pays $1
if the complementary event Ac occurs and $0 otherwise. Let  denote the price of contract
A. No-arbitrage condition dictates that, in equilibrium, the price of contract Ac be 1  .
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Traders. There is a continuum I of competitive traders, each endowed with homogeneous
initial wealth w. The netposition on contract A held by trader i is denoted by xi 2 R.3
Given price , the nal wealth wi of trader i is
wi =
8><>: w + (1  )xi if event A occurs,w   xi if event Ac occurs.
All traders have log utility of their nal wealth: u (wi) = lnwi.
Beliefs and Ambiguity. Suppose trader i has a subjective belief that event A occurs
with probability eq 2 [0; 1]. Then, the subjective expected utility of trader i from holding
position xi at price  is given by
U (; xi; eq) = eq ln (w + (1  )xi) + (1  eq) ln (w   xi) :
However, ambiguity exists, for traders may be uncertain about how likely event A
is to occur. We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and model ambiguity using the
multiple-priorframework. Specically, suppose each trader i considers every probability
eq 2 [qi   ; qi + ], where   0, an admissible probability that governs the realization of
the binary event. Under this framework, qi represents the meanbelief of trader i, while
 is interpreted as a measure of ambiguity. Given price , trader i chooses position xi to
maximize the minimum that is, the worst-case scenario of all her admissible, subjective
expected utilities:
max
xi2R

mineq2[qi ;qi+]U (; xi; eq)

: (1)
3 In practice, trader i can long and/or short contract A and/or contract Ac; but some strategies are
mathematically equivalent. For example, holding mi > 0 units of contract A and ni > mi > 0 units of
contract Ac would be equivalent to holding mi units of cash, 0 unit of contract A , and ni  mi > 0 units
of contract Ac: Therefore, without loss of generality, we let a single decision variable xi = mi   ni (which
could be positive, zero, or negative) represent the netposition held by trader i:
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Traders are heterogeneous in mean belief. Let the distribution of tradersmean beliefs
be characterized by a cumulative distribution function F over interval [; 1  ]. That is,
for the most pessimistic trader, the worst-case belief that A occurs is probability 0 while,
for the most optimistic trader, the best-case belief that A occurs is probability 1.
2.2 Optimal Demand and Portfolio Inertia
Solving the inner minimization reduces the optimization problem (1) to
max
xi2R
U (; xi; qi   sgn (xi) ) ;
where sgn () is an indicator function that takes the sign of its argument.
The intuition behind the above expression is straightforward. If trader i has a positive
position on contract A, then the worst-case scenario would be that event A occurs with
probability qi   , the lower bound. Similarly, if the position of trader i is negative, then,
in the worst-case scenario, event A occurs with the upper-bound probability, qi + .
Solving the maximization problem gives the optimal (net) demand for contract A by
trader i,
x (; qi) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
qi  
(1 )w if  2 [0; qi   ) ;
0 if  2 [qi   ; qi + ] ;
qi+ 
(1 )w if  2 (qi + ; 1] ;
(2)
as a function of price and mean belief. Therefore, trader i longs contract A when the price is
lower than her most pessimistic belief, and shorts contract A when the price is higher than
her most optimistic belief. For any price in the intermediate range [qi   ; qi + ], trader i
does not participate in the prediction market the phenomenon of portfolio inertia.
That portfolio inertia arises when investors have maxmin preferences is well known in
the nance literature since the work by Dow and Werlang (1992). The setup of this model
replicates this phenomenon in the context of prediction markets. In particular, for each
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trader, the size of price region at which portfolio inertia occurs is given by 2. In other
words, the higher the degree of ambiguity, the more inertial the tradersportfolios.
2.3 Equilibrium
Given price  for contract A and distribution function F of traders mean beliefs, the
aggregate (net) demand for the contract is given by
XF () =
Z 1 

x (; q) dF (q) : (3)
The prediction market is in equilibrium when the aggregate demand for contract A
equals zero, that is, XF () = 0. The following proposition establishes the equilibrium
price.4
Proposition 1 Given distribution function F , the equilibrium price F is such that
F = EF (q) +
Z F+
F 
F (q) dq   :
When ambiguity is absent (i.e.,  = 0) the prediction market aggregates the wisdom of
crowds:
F j=0= EF (q) :
That is, the equilibrium price of contract A corresponds to the average of tradersmean
beliefs about the occurrence of event A.
In the presence of ambiguity, however, the prediction market does not necessarily ag-
gregate the wisdom of crowds. In particular, it aggregates the wisdom of crowds if and only
if the distribution function F is such that
R F+
F  F (q) dq = . The next proposition shows
that the situations in which such equality happens to hold are topologically rare.
4We relegate all proofs to Appendix A.
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Proposition 2 With ambiguity, the prediction market rarely aggregates the wisdom of
crowds. Formally, let  be the space of probability distributions over [; 1  ], endowed with
the weak topology. Then, the subset of probability distributions such that the equilibrium
price equals the average of tradersmean beliefs is nowhere dense in .
Propositions 1 and 2 together suggests that the presence of ambiguity renders the pre-
diction market ine¤ective in aggregating the beliefs held by heterogeneous traders.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium quantity of trades is strictly decreasing in the degree of
ambiguity.
Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of portfolio inertia. As the degree of ambiguity
increases, the inaction rangeof each trader i, [qi   ; qi + ], becomes wider. Since each
trader is more likely to stay put in a more ambiguous environment, the aggregate trades
must be fewer as well. This result is reminiscent of well-known models of ambiguity in nan-
cial economics (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; and
Routledge and Zin,2009), which suggest that a signicant increase in Knightian uncertainty
may contribute to liquidity hoarding and market breakdown.
Moreover, the deterrence of trades in a particular way is what causes the failure of
the prediction market to aggregate beliefs. Specically, for any prevailing price , the
traders who stay put are those with moderate beliefs such that their inaction ranges cover
. Those who trade have beliefs that are more extreme either more optimistic or more
pessimistic than the abstainers. Suppose the abstaining traders did trade, the chance of
the hypothetical market price, after aggregating the abstaining tradersbeliefs, happens to
be exactly the same as  is zero.
3 Testable Implications
The previous section has derived the equilibrium results under ambiguity. However, since
the degree of ambiguity is not observable, those results cannot be tested directly. In this
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section, we impose more structures on the model and derive implications that are testable
with prediction-market data.
3.1 Preliminaries
Suppose the true probability that event A occurs is given by p 2 [; 1  ]. Traders do not
know the true probability, but each holds an interval of (subjective) admissible beliefs. We
assume that, for a mass m 2 (0; 1) of traders, their mean beliefs coincide with p. For the
other traders, their mean beliefs are continuously distributed over [; 1  ]. Assumption 1
embeds these additional structures into the distribution function F .
Assumption 1 The distribution function F takes the following form:
F (q) 
8><>: (1 m)F (q) if q 2 [; p) ;(1 m)F (q) +m if q 2 [p; 1  ] ;
where F is some continuous distribution function of q over [; 1  ].
The functional form of F is left unspecied. We let  denote the integral of F , i.e.,
 (q)  R q F (q0) dq0.
The interpretation of Assumption 1 is that there are some traders whose beliefs happen
to be correct. One could provide a micro-foundation for this setup by assuming that, prior
to trading, the mass m of traders have received imperfect private signals that are partially
informative of the true probability, while other traders have received no such signals. With
such a micro-foundation, the traders(multiple) beliefs can be interpreted as their (multiple)
posteriors. In this section, we adopt a reduced-form approach and build these details directly
into the distribution function F .
One may wonder to what extent the mass of traders with correct mean beliefs matters
to deriving testable implications. As will be clear in the next subsection, our theoretical
result does not depend on the exact value of m. Whether the mass is extremely small, in
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which case few traders have the correct beliefs, or very large, which means most traders do,
the main result is unchanged. The essence of this setup is that a fraction of traders are,
to some extent, informedabout the true probability. Therefore, whether they trade or
not, should they choose to abstain makes a qualitative di¤erence in the equilibrium price.
3.2 Implications
Since the distribution function F is given and parameterized by the true probability p,
applying Proposition 1 allows us to solve for the equilibrium price as a function of p, as
shown below.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium price  (p) is:
1. continuous, with  () >  and  (1  ) < 1  ;
2. such that  (p) = b for any p 2 [b   ; b + ];
3. strictly increasing for p =2 [b   ; b + ];
where b is identied by b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ).
Figure 1 plots the equilibrium price in a p  diagram, where the true probability p =
() 1 () is a correspondence of the equilibrium price . Specically, it attains a non-
singleton set value when  = b, with the size of that set equal to 2.
The most important feature of the equilibrium (part 2) is that there exists a range
of true probabilities, [b   ; b + ], within which the market price is not at all responsive
to any change in the underlying state of the world. That is, 0 (p) = 0 for any p in
that range. Instead of predicting, the prediction market simply assignsan uninformative
number b, the mid-point of the range [b   ; b + ], as the price. The reason for this result
is straightforward: Since the traders who have the correct mean beliefs about p are not
trading, what exactly those traders think about the true state of the world must not be
reected in the market price.
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As noted earlier, the exact value of the mass m does not a¤ect the size of the vertical
segment [b   ; b + ], which equals twice the degree of ambiguity. Even ifm is innitesimal,
the market price stops reecting the true probability once these traders abstain from betting.
Outside the range [b   ; b + ], however, the prediction market works (part 3). Specif-
ically, if all parameters of the model were known, one would be able to infer the true
probability p from the equilibrium market price  (p). The higher the true probability, the
higher the price.
Part 1 of the proposition also shows that, for a true probability that is very high (near
1  ) or very low (near ), the equilibrium price exhibits a favorite-longshot bias commonly
observed in the literature (e.g., Cain, Law, and Peel, 2000): favorite events are under-priced
while longshot events are over-priced. The intuition is as follows. For a longshot event where
p = , for example, if the market price was as low as , that would imply all tradersmean
beliefs were greater than the prevailing price and, hence, all traders would long the contract,
which cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium price of a longshot must be
signicantly larger than the longshots odds.
Note that, although the degree of ambiguity, , is not directly observable in real-
ity, Proposition 4 yields implications of the presence of ambiguity that are testable with
prediction-market data. Suppose an econometrician could conduct a large number of re-
peated trials for each value of the true probability. Then, with enough data, the ex post
sample proportion, denoted by P , would converge to the corresponding true probability, p.
It follows that the estimated relationship between P and the market price, , would con-
verge to the graph of the correspondence p = () 1 (). As in Figure 1, such ideal trials
would show a big jump at price level  = b, with P being generally below the 45-degree line
below but close to b, and above it just thereafter. Moreover, since the relationship between
P and  fundamentally shifts between the two continuous segments, our result suggests a
testable structural change near the jump in at b.
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Before conducting the test, the econometrician may not know where the jump would
appear, because b, given by
b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ) ;
depends on the distribution of mean beliefs among all prediction-market traders. It follows
from the above equation that b would be smaller than 0:5 if F is skewed towards the lowest
mean belief , and larger than 0:5 if F is skewed towards the highest mean belief 1  . But
when F is symmetrically distributed over [; 1  ], b would be equal to 0:5, which is the
following corollary.
Corollary 5 Under Assumption 1,
b = 0:5
if F is a symmetric distribution function over [; 1  ] (i.e., F (1  x) = 1  F (x) for any
x 2 [; 1  ]).
In practice, the empirical chart would precisely follow Figure 1 with the jump at 0:5 in
the case of symmetry, but not if asymmetries were present. But even if one might expect
skewness to be present for some contracts but not others, the range for the crossover point
could be scattered about the neighborhood of 0:5. The aggregation of a large number of
contracts, therefore, could push the average b to be in the neighborhood of 0:5. Since
each contract would exhibit a similar (if slightly shifted) pattern, the overall pattern should
loosely follow Figure 1 if Knightian uncertainty is important in these markets, even though
some reect symmetry whereas others do not.
Accordingly, the theory suggests that the empirical relationship between P and  would
contain a testable structural break about the neighborhood of 0:5, where one would expect
to see observations scattered below the 45-degree line to the left of the break-point, and
above the 45-degree line to the right. The presence of a structural break adjacent to 0:5,
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therefore, would be an indication that Knightian uncertainty is a factor in the market, and
would be consistent with the intuition provided in the introduction.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some high-level evidence that is consistent with the theoretical
predictions.5
We use the historical data from Intrade, a popular online prediction platform which
operated from 2003 to 2013. The platform hosted prediction contracts across wide-ranging
categories of events, such as business (e.g., whether the CEO of a certain company would
step down), current events (e.g., which city would host the Olympic), entertainment (e.g.,
which movie would win the Academy Award for the Best Picture), politics (e.g., which
candidate would be elected the U.S. president), etc. We collect all those contracts that
are on binary events, regardless of their categories, and record how each binary event had
turned out.
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the ex post sample proportion, P , of
event As occurrence as a function of the ex ante price, , of contract A. We process the
data in the following way. The observations are sorted by price and evenly partitioned into
a number of percentile bins. For each percentile bin, we calculate the sample proportion
of event As occurrences whose corresponding prices fall into that bin. Finally, we plot the
sample proportions against the mid-points of the corresponding price bins.
If the theory developed in the previous section holds, the following is what one would
expect in the empirics. Recall that the value of b depends on the distribution of mean
beliefs among traders. Since each observation in the dataset is from a certain market with
a certain distribution of mean beliefs held by the participating traders, we can interpret
each observation as a single draw from the data-generating process associated with a certain
5See Appendix B for the details of the data.
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version of Figure 1. For a price bin closer to 0, therefore, it is more likely that the obser-
vations contained in the bin have been drawn from the left part of Figure 1, i.e., below the
break-point. Similarly, for a price bin closer to 1, the observations are more likely to have
been drawn from the right part of Figure 1, i.e., above the break-point. More important,
when the price bin is near 0:5, the observations are more likely to be from just around the
jump, suggesting a structural break.
We start with the empirical evidence from political events, one of the largest categories
in the Intrade dataset. These events, like Brexit and U.S. presidential elections, often see
a high volume of transactions between bettors. Figure 2, based on a partition into 50
bins (i.e., 2% of observations per bin), plots the sample proportion for all bins against the
corresponding price. Since prices evolve in the prediction markets until the random events
are realized, the two panels of the gure together capture the e¤ect of timing by showing
the estimation for two di¤erent dates: (a) the rst day market opens to bettors, and (b) the
last trading day before the event starts to take place. For example, the market for whether
Barack Obama would win the 2008 U.S. presidential election rst opened on October 23,
2006. For our purpose, November 3, 2008 the day before the election day is identied as
the last trading day.
We are interested in whether there is a discontinuity in the relationship between the
price and the sample proportion, which falls into the well-developed literature about test-
ing structural breaks. For each panel of Figure 2, we conduct three analyses. First, a linear
regression assuming no structural breaks is shown as the dashed line in the diagram. Next,
we run two types of break-point tests an F test6 and a moving sum of residuals(MO-
SUM) test7 against the null hypothesis that there is no structural breaks for the entire
sample. Lastly, we re-run the linear regression by estimating the location of one break-point
6The F test is an extension of the Chow test(1960), against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown
break-point. See, e.g., Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) for details.
7The MOSUM test analyzes the moving sum of residuals and detects whether a strong shift of the
uctuation process exists. See, e.g., Chu, Hornik, and Kuan (1995a, b) for details.
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(as suggested by our theory). The estimation returns (i) a linear segment on each side of
the estimated structural break, plotted as the solid lines in the diagram, as well as (ii) the
location of the structural break, identied by two red dots in the diagram corresponding to,
respectively, the last observation of the rst segment and the rst observation of the second
segment. The details of the three analyses are shown in the column 50 binsof Table 1.
A few remarks on the results follow. First, in both panels, the regression lines without
structural breaks fall very close to the 45-degree line, suggesting the overall e¢ ciency of
markets in pricing the probabilities of random events. The evidence of market e¢ ciency
on the rst trading day is remarkable because, for politics, a lot of markets opened a long
time sometimes years ahead of the resolution of the events. Yet, as the regression table
shows, the slopes are statistically signicant and very close to 1.
Second, although panel (a) is relatively noisier, panel (b) shows a clear pattern as
predicted by our theory: The null hypothesis of no structural breaks is cleared rejected
by the tests, and the break-point estimation shows a signicant jump near price level 0:5.
The diagram, hence, resembles our prediction shown in Figure 1. For observations in the
intermediate price range, one might think that the price is close to 0:5 because traders have
solid information suggesting an even matchbetween outcome A and Ac. It is also possible,
however, that the market is shrouded in ambiguity as some traders, albeit partially informed,
are reluctant to trade. Just like in the example of a Knightian urn, an intermediate price in
this case could mean a wide range of true probabilities. In panel (b), for a price in the break
region between 0:57 and 0:69, the sample proportion could be as low as 33%, or as high as
83%. In other words, the degree of ambiguity, , in this particular example is about 0:25 (i.e.,
half of 83%  33%). Such a magnitude is signicant not only statistically as the rejection
of null hypothesis no structural breaks implies the rejection of  equals to zero but
also economically. According to the multiple-prior framework, it would mean that a typical
trader would consider all the probabilities within an interval of length 0:5 equally admissible
in governing the realization of the binary event. A signicant jump near price level 0:5 like
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the one in panel (b), therefore, is an indication of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. As
the linear regression without breaks shows, the specic pattern of observations also causes
the regression line to have a slope larger albeit only slightly than 1.
Another important di¤erence between the two panels is that, in panel (b), more obser-
vations are clustered near price levels 0 and 1. This means, by the last day, more traders
hold (posterior) beliefs that some outcome either A or Ac is very likely to be realized,
suggesting a decrease in risks over time. Such a decrease in risks can be a result of in-
formation acquisition by the traders, who, until the random events resolve, may have the
incentives to learn about the events and update their bets accordingly. Since risks have
decreased while ambiguity remains, our empirical evidence also suggests an observational
distinction between the concepts of risk and Knightian uncertainty.
Furthermore, the above empirical patterns are to some extent robust against the choice
of the number of bins. Figure 3 reproduces the diagram by partitioning the data into 30
bins instead. The column 30 bins of Table 1 shows the details of the regression and
break-point analysis. Overall, the observations drawn earlier still hold.8
The observation that ambiguity remains until the last trading day suggests, unlike risks,
Knightian uncertainty may be not learnable in practice to the traders. The intuition
can be illustrated using the Knightian urn where the composition of black and red balls is
unknown. Imagine two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, a subject observed repeated
draws from the same Knightian urn. In this case, the sample proportion over time would
reveal the true composition of the two colors because, after all, the composition is xed
over time. In the second scenario, there was an experimenter who replaced the Knightian
urn with a new one every time a ball was drawn by the subject. In this case, the sample
proportion may not inform the subject of what to expect in the next Knightian urn, simply
because the composition of black and red balls in the new urn could be anything of the
8We have checked other variations between 30 and 50, which yield similar results (omitted to limit space).
Obviously, the number of bins should be neither too small (which would leave too few points in the diagram),
nor too large (which would leave too few observations per bin).
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experimenters choosing. If the underlying data-generating process that is, the way the
experimenter changed every other Knightian urn was not learnable to the subject, then
the degree of ambiguity would not decrease over time.9 One might think that, in politics,
it is intuitively easy for traders to acquire knowledge from polls, news reports, political
analyses, etc. Yet, our empirical evidence, which is based on a large number of prediction
markets about various political events, seems to t the second scenario, suggesting that
the Knightian uncertainty of politics may indeed be not learnable through information
acquisition.
We now turn to another major category: entertainment events, such as the winners of
cinematic awards or the box o¢ ces of movies. Figures 4 and 5 reproduce the P - diagram
for 30 bins and 50 bins, respectively, and Table 2 reports the details of the regressions
and break-point tests. Although qualitatively similar, the patterns are less pronounced
compared to politics. The jump near 0:5 is less clear and, interestingly, the clustering near
0 and 1 is less marked. This evidence suggests less learning in entertainment than in politics,
which is understandable since it is more di¢ cult for bettors to acquire information about
the general publics personal tastes of movies and music.
Politics and entertainment together account for over 80% of the Intrade dataset. How-
ever, for completeness, we reproduce the empirical evidence with the full sample, as shown
in Figures 6 and 7, as well as Table 3. The patterns, essentially by construction, are similar
to what we established above.
5 Concluding Remarks
Knightian uncertainty an important theoretical concept in the literature that is often used
to explain observed phenomena has never been directly evidenced in an empirical setting.
In this paper, we have developed a model of a prediction market with ambiguity, where
9See Epstein and Schneider (2007) for a theoretical treatment of learning under ambiguity.
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traders have maxmin preferences. We have derived more direct, observational implications
of the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the historical betting data from Intrade, we
have further presented some high-level evidence that is consistent with the prediction of our
model. In particular, for price levels close to 0:5, the market-implied, ex ante probability of
a random event is not indicative of the ex post sample proportion, suggesting the presence
of Knightian uncertainty.
Moreover, our empirical evidence has shown that, although traders seem to have acquired
information which leads to a decrease in risks, ambiguity remains until the last trading
day, suggesting that the Knightian uncertainty of the world may be not learnable to
traders. By comparing political events and entertainment events, we have also shown that
the empirical patterns we identied are more pronounced in politics than in entertainment.
The evidence we have provided is only preliminary, since the empirics of this paper are
based on a single prediction platform that is skewed towards political and entertainment
events. In a future, empirical study, we will collect more prediction-market data across
di¤erent platforms and di¤erent event types, and we will examine more closely the relation-
ship between the ex post sample proportion and the ex ante price by taking into account
the type of events, the time ahead of the resolution of randomness, and other aspects of the
betting markets.
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
American Enterprise Institute
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Note that any equilibrium price  has to satisfy (i)  > 2 and
(ii)  < 1  2. If (i) does not hold, then   qi +  for all i, which means any trader will
have either a long position or a zero position not an equilibrium. Similarly, if (ii) does not
hold, no trader will have a long position, which cannot be an equilibrium either.
Substitute (2) into (3) and rewrite the aggregate demand as
XF () =
Z  

q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) +
Z 1 
+
q     
 (1  )wdF (q) :
Hence, XF () = 0 if and only if
Z  

(q +   ) dF (q) +
Z 1 
+
(q     ) dF (q) = 0
,
Z  

(q   ) dF (q) +
Z 1 
+
(q   ) dF (q) +
Z  

dF (q) 
Z 1 
+
dF (q) = 0
, EF (q)    
Z +
 
(q   ) dF (q) +  [F (   ) + F ( + )  1] = 0
, EF (q)   +
Z +
 
F (q) dq   [(q   )F (q)]+  +  [F (   ) + F ( + )  1] = 0;
where the last step follows from integration by parts. Simplifying and rearranging terms
yields the stated expression in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let G be the space of distribution functions over [; 1  ],
endowed with the Lévy metric `, where
` (G1; G2)
 inf f" > 0 j G1 (q   ")  "  G2  G1 (q + ") + " for all q 2 [; 1  ]g
for any G1; G2 2 G. Let F be the subset of G that satises F = EF (q) for any F 2 F .
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Since the Lévy metric metrizes the weak topology,10 the proposition is equivalent to the
claim that F is nowhere dense in (G; `).
Note that F is closed. Since a set is nowhere dense if and only if the complement of its
closure is dense,11, it remains to be shown G n F is dense, that is, for any point in G, there
is a sequence from G nF converging to that point. It is thus enough to show, for any F 2 F
and any  > 0, there exists some G 2 G n F such that ` (F;G) < .
F is non-decreasing since it is a distribution function. It follows that
lim
q![EF (q)+] 
F (q)  F (EF (q)  ) :
We show prove the results by examining two cases.
Case 1 : limq![EF (q)+]  F (q) > F (EF (q)  ).
Given  > 0, we construct a distribution function G from F as
G (q) 
8>>>><>>>>:
F (q) if q 2 [;EF (q)    1) ;
F (EF (q)  ) if q 2 [EF (q)    1;EF (q) + + 2) ;
F (q) if q 2 [EF (q) + + 2; 1  ] ;
where 1; 2 > 0 are such that function g  G  F satises conditions
Z EF (q)++2
EF (q)  1
g (q) dq = 0
and
max fg (EF (q)    1) ; g (EF (q) + + 2)g = 
2
:
It is easily veried that G is a mean-preserving spread of F , with two new atoms created
10See, e.g., Huber and Ronchetti (2009), p. 28.
11See, e.g., Sutherland (1975), p. 64.
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at points EF (q)    1 and EF (q) + + 2. By construction, this implies that
Z EG(q)+
EG(q) 
G (q) dq =
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
G (q) dq
=
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
[F (q) + g (q)] dq
= +
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
g (q) dq < ;
where the last equality holds because F 2 F , and the inequality is due to g (EF (q) + ) < 0
which implies
R EF (q)+
EF (q)  g (q) dq < 0. Since
R EG(q)+
EG(q)  G (q) dq < , G 2 G n F . Finally, let 
be the uniform metric, that is,
 (G1; G2)  sup fjG1 (q) G2 (q)j j q 2 [; 1  ]g
for any G1; G2 2 G. By construction,  (F;G) = 2 . Since the Lévy metric is bounded by
the uniform metric from above, that is, ` (G1; G2)   (G1; G2) for any G1; G2 2 G, we have
` (F;G)  2 < .
Case 2 : limq![EF (q)+]  F (q) = F (EF (q)  ).
Given  > 0, we construct a distribution function H from F as
H (q) 
8>>>><>>>>:
F (q) if q 2 [;EF (q)  ) ;
F (EF (q)  ) + 3 if q 2 [EF (q)  ;EF (q) + + 4) ;
F (q) if q 2 [EF (q) + + 4; 1  ] ;
where 3; 4 > 0 are such that function h  H   F satises conditions
Z EF (q)++4
EF (q) 
h (q) dq = 0
and
max f3; h (EF (q) + + 4)g = 
2
:
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It is easily veried that H is a mean-preserving spread of F , with two new atoms created
at points EF (q)   and EF (q) + + 4. By construction, this implies that
Z EG(q)+
EG(q) 
H (q) dq =
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
H (q) dq
=
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
[F (q) + h (q)] dq
= +
Z EF (q)+
EF (q) 
h (q) dq
= + 23 > ;
where the last but second equality holds because F 2 F , and the last equality follows from
the construction of H. Since
R EG(q)+
EG(q)  H (q) dq > , H 2 G n F . Finally, similar to Case 1,
we have  (F;H) = 2 and, hence, ` (F;H) < .
Proof of Proposition 3. Decompose XF () into the aggregate supply (shorts) SF ()
and the aggregate demand (longs) DF (), where
SF () =
Z  

 q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) ; DF () =
Z 1 
+
q     
 (1  )wdF (q) ;
and SF (F ) = DF (

F ) in equilibrium. We show that an increase in  shifts the supply
curve inwards. That is,
dSF ()
d
= 0 +
+   
 (1  )wdF () 
Z  

@
@
q +   
 (1  )wdF (q) < 0:
Similarly, an increase in  shifts the demand curve inwards (i.e., dDF ()d < 0). It follows that
the equilibrium quantity of trade SF (F ), or DF (

F ) has to be smaller as the degree
of ambiguity increases.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let  denote the integral of F , i.e.,  (q)  R q F (q0) dq0. It
follows from the denition of F that
 (q) =
Z q

F
 
q0

dq0 =
8><>: (1 m) (q) if q 2 [; p) ;(1 m) (q) +m (q   p) if q 2 [p; 1  ] ;
where  is the integral of F . The equilibrium condition becomes
 = EF (q) +  ( + )   (   )  
= 1  2   (1  ) +  ( + )   (   ) ;
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Since  (q) has a kink at point
p, the equilibrium price depends on the position of p relative to  +  and    .
Case 1 :      p   + .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m) (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m) ( + ) +m ( +   p)  (1 m) (   ) :
Rearranging terms and dividing both sides by 1 m yields
    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) :
Case 2 : p >  + .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m) (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m) ( + )  (1 m) (   ) :
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Rearranging terms yields

1 m    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) +
(p  )m
1 m : (4)
Note that the left-hand side of equation (4) is strictly increasing in . Thus, the solution
 to the equation is a continuous and strictly increasing function of p. Furthermore, as
p ! b + , where b is the equilibrium price in Case 1, the right-hand side of equation (4)
converges to 1  2   (1  ) + bm1 m , and the solution to the equation converges to b. In
other words, the equilibrium price is continuous at point p = b + .
Next, we show  (1  ) < 1   2, which implies  (1  ) < 1    in part 1 of the
proposition. Let LHS () and RHS (p) denote the left- and right-hand sides of equation
(4), as functions of  and p, respectively. Note that
LHS (1  2) RHS (1  ) =

1  2
1 m    (1  ) +  (1  3)

 

1  2   (1  ) + (1  2)m
1 m

= (1  3) > 0:
Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation when p = 1   must be
smaller than 1  2.
Case 3 : p <    .
The equilibrium condition is rewritten as
 = 1  2  (1 m) (1  ) m (1    p)
+ (1 m) ( + ) +m ( +   p)
  (1 m) (   ) m (     p) :
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Rearranging terms yields

1 m    ( + ) +  (   ) = 1  2   (1  ) +
(p+ )m
1 m : (5)
Similar to Case 2, the solution  to equation (5) is continuous and strictly increasing in
p, and it converges to b as p ! b   . Hence, the equilibrium price is continuous at point
p = b    as well.
Next, we show  () > 2, which implies  () >  in part 1 of the proposition. Again,
let LHS () and RHS (p) denote the left- and right-hand sides of equation (5). Note that
LHS (2) RHS () =

2
1 m    (3) +  ()

 

1  2   (1  ) + 2m
1 m

=

 (1  )   (3)  [(1  )  3] < 0;
where the last inequality holds because  is the integral of distribution function F over
[; 1  ]. Since LHS is strictly increasing in , the solution to the equation when p = 
must be larger than 2.
Proof of Corollary 5. Recall that b is identied by equation
b    (b + ) +  (b   ) = 1  2   (1  ) :
The symmetry of F implies   (1  x) = (x  )    (x) for any x 2 [; 1  ]. Thus, the
equilibrium condition becomes
b   b +(1  b   )+(b   ) = 1  2  1  2+()
,  (1  b   )   (b   ) =  () = 0;
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to which b = 0:5 is the only solution.
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Appendix B Intrade Historical Data
The historical data of Intrade was archived by Ipeirotis (2013) and is available on GitHub.
Table 4 lists all the categories of events and the number of markets within each category. We
complete the dataset by creating an outcome variable and recording how each random event
had turned out. The outcome equals 1 if an event occurs, and it equals 0 if its complement
event occurs.
Some markets have correlated outcomes, because they are about the same, uncertain cir-
cumstances. For example, concerning the 2012 U.S. Republican Party presidential nominee,
there are 53 separate markets corresponding to 53 possible winners, including Mitt Romney,
Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, Newt Gingrich, and any other individualnot specied by the
prediction platform. To avoid such correlation in the observations, for each group of these
correlated markets, we randomly select one market into the aggregate sample and disregard
the rest.
The total number of selected markets included in the nal analysis also shown in Table 5.
The table lists the number of observations the total as well as the number of observations
per percentile bin for political events, entertainment events, and the full sample. The
dataset is skewed towards political and entertainment events, as the two categories together
accounts for 82% of the full sample.
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Table 1: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Politics
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.953 0.950
(22.7) (21.5)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.727 0.690
(5.75) (5.13)
break region [0.45, 0.47] [0.43, 0.47]
slope (segment 2) 0.863 0.867
(7.70) (7.56)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.03 1.04
(44.8) (44.8)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.617 0.767
(15.6) (21.4)
break region [0.57, 0.69] [0.60, 0.75]
slope (segment 2) 0.464 0.229
(5.10) (2.13)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 2: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Entertainment
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.933 0.936
(20.9) (23.3)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.859 0.929
(8.66) (16.2)
break region [0.50, 0.50] [0.68, 0.73]
slope (segment 2) 0.881 1.49
(6.80) (4.89)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.04 1.04
(33.7) (37.8)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected^ not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.744 0.697
(10.3) (10.3)
break region [0.50, 0.51] [0.44, 0.49]
slope (segment 2) 0.866 1.00
(9.02) (16.2)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 3: Estimation and Test of Structural Breaks: Full Sample
Dependent variable: ex post sample proportion
Independent variable: ex ante price
50 bins 30 bins
(a) rst trading day
slope (no breaks) 0.917 0.929
(63.6) (27.7)
tests of no breaks
F test not rejected not rejected
MOSUM test not rejected not rejected
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.936 0.739
(18.0) (8.50)
break region [0.59, 0.61] [0.44, 0.48]
slope (segment 2) 1.26 0.876
(9.56) (10.5)
(b) last trading day
slope (no breaks) 1.03 1.03
(56.6) (46.5)
tests of no breaks
F test rejected rejected
MOSUM test rejected rejected^
structural break estimation
slope (segment 1) 0.853 0.812
(25.2) (20.9)
break region [0.62, 0.68] [0.55, 0.65]
slope (segment 2) 0.693 0.765
(7.84) (9.27)
t statistics in parentheses
^ p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 4: Intrade Data: Event Categories and Number of Markets.
Event category Number of markets
Art 60
Business 43
Chess 52
Climate & Weather 861
Construction & Engineering 9
Current Events 1540
Education 1
Entertainment 8715
Fine Wine 5
Foreign A¤airs 87
Legal 310
Media 10
Politics 5460
Real Estate 2
Science 20
Social & Civil 30
Technologies 65
Transportation 11
Table 5: Intrade Data: Number of Observations in Final Analysis.
Event category Total observations Observations per bin
(50 bins) (30 bins)
Politics 897 18 30
Entertainment 1157 23 39
Full sample 2509 50 84
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Figure 1: Prediction Market Equilibrium in the P - Diagram.
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Figure 2: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Politics (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 3: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Politics (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 4: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Entertainment (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 5: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Entertainment (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 6: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Full Sample (50 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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Figure 7: Prediction Market Data in the P - Diagram: Full Sample (30 bins).
(Note: The dashed lines are regression lines without breaks. The solid lines are regression lines
with one estimated break, with two red dots identifying the location of the break.)
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